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Abstract 
The exact relation between the sense that one’s body is one’s own (body-ownership) and 
the sense that one controls one’s own bodily actions (agency) has been the focus of much 
speculation, but remains unclear.  On an ‘additive’ model, agency and body-ownership are 
strongly related; the ability to control actions is a powerful cue to body-ownership. This view 
implies a component common to the senses of body-ownership and agency, plus possible 
additional components unique to agency. An alternative ‘independence’ model holds that agency 
and body-ownership are qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different inputs, and 
recruiting distinct brain networks.  We tested these two specific models by investigating the 
sensory and motor aspects of body-representation in the brain using fMRI. Activations in 
midline cortical structures were associated with a sensory-driven sense of body-ownership, and 
were absent in agency conditions. Activity in the pre-SMA was linked to the sense of agency, 
but distinct from the sense of body-ownership. No shared activations that would support the 
additive model were found. The results support the independence model. Body-ownership 
involves a psychophysiological baseline, linked to activation of the brain’s default mode 
network.  Agency is linked to premotor and parietal areas involved in generating motor 
intentions and subsequent action monitoring. 
 
Keywords: agency, body-ownership, supplementary motor area, parietal cortex, cortical 
midline structures, self 




The basic embodied sense of self is a complex conscious state, with several 
dissociable components (Longo et al., 2008).  Among these are the sense of ownership of 
one’s body (i.e body-ownership), and also the sense of agency over one’s own actions 
(Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach and Gallagher 2007). The feeling that the body I inhabit is ‘my 
own’, and ever-present in my mental life, is called body-ownership. My body is an integral 
part of ‘me’, in a way that other objects are not.  Moreover, the relation between my body and 
‘me’ is quite different from the relation between my body and other people (Descartes 
1637/2006). In contrast, the feeling that I can move and control my body is called the sense 
of agency. The sense of agency gives a special phenomenal quality to self-generated motor 
actions and external events caused by those actions.  For example, the relationship between 
my actions and ‘me’ differs from the relation between observed actions carried out by other 
agents or without my voluntary control (de Vignemont and Fourneret 2004).  
The sense of body-ownership is normally continuous and omnipresent.  Thus, we 
experience body-ownership not only during voluntary actions, but also during passive 
movement and at rest (see Longo et al., 2009; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002).  In contrast, 
only voluntary actions should produce a sense of agency. Several studies confirm that agency 
is closely linked to the generation of efferent motor signals and the monitoring of their effects 
(e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith 2002).  In contrast, the sense of body-ownership can be 
induced by afferent sensory signals alone (Botvinick and Cohen 1998).  However, the exact 
relation between agency and body-ownership remains unknown. On one view, the relation 
between agency and body-ownership is additive, meaning that agency entails body-
ownership.  This view follows from the observation that one can control movements of one’s 
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own body, but not other objects, at will (Descartes 1637/2006).  Thus, agency offers a strong 
cue to body ownership.  On this view, the sense of agency should involve the sense of body-
ownership, plus a possible additional experience of voluntary control. An alternative view 
holds that sense of agency and sense of body-ownership are qualitatively different 
experiences, without any common component. 
Previous accounts based on introspective evidence favour the additive model, since 
they identified a common sense of body-ownership, plus an additional component unique to 
action control (Longo and Haggard 2009).  Recent behavioural and neuroimaging studies 
have also focused on the neurocognitive processes that underpin body-ownership and agency 
(Fink et al. 1999; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al. 2003; Ehrsson, Spence and Passingham 
2004; Tsakiris et al. 2007), but the exact neural bases of these two aspects of self-
consciousness remain unclear.  For example, neuroimaging studies that investigated the sense 
of body-ownership using the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI, see Botvinick and Cohen 1998) 
report activations in the bilateral premotor cortex and the right posterior insula associated 
with the illusion of ownership of the rubber hand, and present only when visual and tactile 
stimulations are synchronized (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Tsakiris et al. 2007). Studies investigating 
the neural signatures of the sense of agency have used similar methods, such as the 
systematic manipulation of visual feedback to alter the experience of one’s body in action. 
Activity in the right posterior insula was correlated with the degree of match between the 
performed and viewed movement, and thus with self-attribution (Farrer et al. 2003). 
Conversely, activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fink et al. 1999; Leube et al. 
2003), right inferior parietal lobe and temporo-parietal junction (Farrer et al. 2003, 2008) was 
associated with degree of disparity between performed and viewed movement, and thus with 
actions not attributed to the self.  
Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership 
  
5
These studies were largely based on manipulating visual feedback to either match or 
mismatch the participant’s manual action. However, such manipulations cannot separate the 
contributions of efferent and afferent signals that are both inevitably present in manual action.  
These imaging data of these studies may therefore confound the neural correlates of agency 
and body-ownership.  For example, with undistorted visual feedback of an action, there is a 
three-way match between efferent motor commands, afferent proprioceptive signals, and 
vision.  Thus, any effects seen in such conditions could be due to congruence between (a) 
efferent and proprioceptive signals, (b) efferent signals and visual feedback, (c) 
proprioceptive signals and visual feedback, or (d) some complex interaction of all three 
signals. Conversely, when visual feedback is distorted (spatially or temporally), there is 
sensori-motor conflict between efferent signals and vision, but also inter-sensory conflict 
between proprioceptive and vision.  As a result, any differences between match and mismatch 
conditions could reflect sensori-motor comparisons (relating to sense of agency) or 
proprioceptive-visual comparisons (relating to sense of body-ownership).  As a result, such 
experimental designs cannot distinguish between the additive and the independence model of 
agency and body-ownership.  
However, the senses of agency and body-ownership can be disentangled 
experimentally, by comparing voluntary action with passive movement.  Both involve 
physically comparable movement and proprioceptive feedback, but are physiologically and 
psychologically very different. In particular, voluntary action depends on a cascade of 
preparatory cognitive-motor processes within the brain’s frontal lobes (Haggard 2008).  
These preparatory processes contribute to our sense of agency over the action and its 
subsequent external effects, but are absent during passive movement. Comparing active with 
passive movements experimentalises Wittgenstein’s (1953/1958) question (pg. 621): “what is 
left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”  This 
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approach can test whether agency represents the addition of action programming to the 
somatic experience of body movement or whether agency and body-ownership are 
qualitatively different.  It also allows a clear operationalisation of body-ownership, without 
confounding by agency. 
Here we sought to disentangle the neural basis of the relation between the sense of 
body-ownership and agency using fMRI. We manipulated body-ownership by presenting 
real-time or delayed visual feedback of movements, and agency, by comparing voluntary and 
passive movements. Synchronous visual feedback causes body-parts and bodily events to be 
attributed to one’s own self (Longo & Haggard, 2009).  This factorial design effectively 
operationalizes the senses of agency and body-ownership; the passive movement condition 
with synchronous visual feedback is a canonical condition producing body-ownership 
(Tsakiris, Prabhu & Haggard, 2008), and the active movement condition with synchronous 
visual feedback is a canonical condition producing agency (Longo & Haggard, 2009). To 
investigate the relation between body-ownership and agency, we aimed to test two specific 
models.  The first, additive model, holds that agency entails body-ownership.  On this view, 
active movements of the body should produce both a sense of body-ownership and a sense of 
agency. The feeling of being in control of one’s body should involve the sense of body-
ownership, plus an additional sense of agency.  This produces three concrete predictions 
about brain activations in agency and ownership conditions: first there should be some 
activations common to conditions that produce agency and body-ownership.  Second, there 
should be an additional activation in the condition that produces agency, which is absent from 
the condition that produces body-ownership.  Third, there should be no activation in the 
condition that produces body-ownership that is not also present in the condition that produces 
agency.  A second model, the independence model, holds that sense of agency and sense of 
body-ownership are qualitatively different experiences, without any common component. On 
Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership 
  
7
this view, the brain could contain distinct networks for sense of body-ownership and sense of 
agency. The independence model produces three concrete predictions: first, there should be 
no common activations between conditions that produce agency and ownership.  Second, 
there should be specific activations in conditions producing a sense of agency that are absent 
from other conditions.  Third, there should be a specific activation in conditions that produce 
ownership without agency that are absent from condition inducing agency. 
Materials and Methods 
Experimental Design 
A 2x2 factorial design was used. The first factor was the type of movement (active or 
passive), and the second factor was the visual feedback (real-time or delayed). Participants 
viewed a video image of their right hand that was covered with a woollen glove. This image 
could be direct (synchronous) or delayed (asynchronous, 500 ms video delay).  In the passive 
condition, an experimenter passively lifted and lowered the index finger up and down, at 
approximately 0.5 Hz, by pulling a thread attached to a ring around the participant’s finger.  In 
the active condition, the participant actively lifted and lowered their finger at a similar rate.  
Thus, there were four conditions: active synchronous (AS), active asynchronous (AA), passive 
synchronous (PS), and passive asynchronous (PA). 
Experimental Set-up and Methods 
The methods were based on a previous behavioural study (Tsakiris, Prabhu, and Haggard 
2007) with modifications appropriate for the fMRI scanning environment. Whilst the brain scans 
were being performed, the participant rested comfortably in a supine position on the bed in the 
MRI scanner. All participants wore headphones to reduce noise and to communicate with the 
experimenters between runs. Within the cylindrical head coil, the head was tilted approximately 
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20-30 degrees by placing foam wedges underneath.  To reduce potential head movements, we 
fixed the position of the head using foam pads. The natural direction of gaze was oblique so that 
the participants saw a projection screen attached to the bore of the scanner through direct vision 
without discomfort. The participant’s right arm was placed on a tilted (30-45°) plastic table that 
was positioned over the stomach of the participant, in a relaxed position. The table was covered 
with a soft black material.  Participants did not have direct vision of their hand. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
A mirror was placed above the participant’s hand at approximately 45° angle and a 
colour MRI-compatible video camera recorded the mirror image of the participant’s right hand.  
This video image was fed to a PC in the control room which projected the image of the hand 
onto a projection screen either with minimal delay (synchronous condition) or with a systematic 
delay (asynchronous condition).  The video presentation was controlled by a custom LabView 
(National Instruments, Austin, TX) script.  In the synchronous condition, there was an 
irreducible delay of approximately 100 ms due to digitisation and projection of the image.  In the 
asynchronous condition the delay was approximately 500 ms.  Healthy adults perceive viewed 
actions as self-generated at delays up to 150 ms (Franck et al. 2001), suggesting that the 100 ms 
delay should not adversely affect illusion of body-ownership and agency (Blakemore et al. 
1999).  The script also flipped the image to undo the reversal created by filming the mirror 
image of the hand.  The resulting image mimicked the perspective the participant would have 
had they directly viewed their hand.  The distance of the camera from the hand was adjusted 
before the experiment so that the image of the hand on the projection screen was approximately 
life size. 
There were three functional runs. Each run began with 15 seconds of rest followed by 
four blocks of stimulation.  Each block was comprised of four trials, one of each of the four 
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conditions in random order.  Trials began with four seconds of written instructions (‘Passive’ or 
‘Active’) indicating to the participant whether the upcoming trial would involve active or 
passive movements.  Following the instructions, the video image was displayed and finger 
movements began.  The video image was displayed for 36 seconds.  Following each block, there 
was a rest period of 25 seconds in which participants saw a black screen.  Thus, there were a 
total of 16 trials (4 of each condition) in each run. 
Following the experiment, and once the participants were outside the MRI suite, they 
were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with ten statements concerning their 
experience during the various conditions of the fMRI experiment (see Table 2). Responses were 
made using a 7-point Likert scale, where a score of +3 indicated strong agreement with the 
statement, -3 strong disagreement with the statement, and 0 neither agreement nor disagreement.  
Judgments for each statement were made separately for each of the four conditions.  The order 
of statements was randomised for each participant.  This questionnaire has been used previously 
to measure subjective experiences of body-ownership and agency in a similar experimental 
situation (Longo and Haggard 2009).  An overall measure of body-ownership was computed by 
averaging across items (1) – (3), with items (2) and (3) being scored in reverse.  An overall 
measure of agency was computed by averaging across items (4) – (6), with item 6 being scored 
negatively. 
Participants 
Twenty naïve healthy right-handed volunteers (eight female), between 18 and 36 years of 
age (M = 24.8 , SD = 5), with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness participated with 
informed consent. All but one were right handed (M = 77.2, SD = 43.6, range: -81.8 – 100) as 
assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield 1971).  The study was approved by the local 
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ethics committee. One participant was excluded because of large head-movement artefacts. The 
analyses reported refer to the 19 remaining participants. 
fMRI Methods:  Image Acquisition and data analysis   
The functional imaging was conducted in a Siemens Sonata 1.5T Scanner to acquire 
gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images with blood oxygenation level dependent 
contrast (BOLD) as an index of local increases in synaptic activity. A functional image volume 
comprised 48 continuous slices of 3mm thickness which ensured that the whole brain was within 
the field of view.  Volumes were acquired continuously with a TR of 4.32 s.  A total of 175 
scans were collected during each functional run (12.6 min), with the first four volumes 
subsequently discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Thus during the three experimental 
runs performed for each participant a total 525 image volumes were collected.  
Data analyses were conducted using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5; Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) using MATLAB 
7.3 (Mathworks, Natick, MA).  All volumes were realigned and unwraped to correct for head 
movements.  The voxel size of normalized images was 2 x 2 x 2 mm.  Resulting volumes were 
normalized to a standard EPI template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
reference brain, and smoothed with an isotropic 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian 
kernel.  For each run, time series in each voxel were high-pass filtered at 1/128 Hz to remove 
low-frequency confounds. 
For each individual participant, we fitted a linear regression model (general linear model) 
to the data (first level analysis). First-level analyses were conducted for each participant by 
modelling the four experimental conditions and instructions with box-car functions and 
convolving them with a canonical hemodynamic response function. To eliminate confounds 
associated with the total amount of movement in each condition (see Results section), the 
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number of finger movements in each block was included as a separate block-level regressor. We 
defined linear contrasts in the general linear model.  The results of this analysis were contrast 
estimates for each condition from each of the 19 participants (contrast images). To 
accommodate inter-subject variability, the contrast images from all participants were entered 
into a random effect group analysis (second level analysis) using a 2x2 factorial (movement 
[active, passive], synchrony [synchronous, asynchronous]) analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Brain activity localization was identified using the atlas of neuroanatomy by Duvernoy (1999) 
and the SPM anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2005). 
To analyse the main effects of our experimental manipulations, we computed differential 
activation patterns associated with synchronous in contrast to asynchronous visual feedback 
[(AS+PS)-(AA+PA)] and vice versa [(AA+PA)-(AS+PS)]. We similarly computed differential 
patterns of activations associated with active movement in contrast to passive movement 
[(AS+AA)-(PS+PA)] and vice versa [(PS+PA)-(AS+AA)].  Activations were identified using a 
corrected (with False Discovery Rate; Genovese, Lazar, and Nichols 2002) two-tailed height 
threshold of p<0.05 and an extent threshold of k > 10 contiguous voxels throughout the brain. 
We also report areas predicted that survive p < 0.05 small volume correction using a 10 mm 
sphere over coordinates from previous studies (Farrer et al. 2008). We additionally report 
regions surviving a two-tailed uncorrected threshold of p <0.001. 
In addition, to evaluate the different models of agency discussed in the introduction, we 
performed a structured series of contrasts using the masking procedure of SPM5. Exclusive 
masking procedures identify clusters that are active for one contrast but not for the other, while 
inclusive masking procedures allow for the identification of clusters that are active for both 
contrasts.  
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
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Both the additive and independence models predict that there should be agency-related 
activations specific to the AS condition, that do not appear in the PS condition.  The interaction 
term of the classic ANOVA, expressed as [(AS – PS) – (AA – PA)], does not specifically isolate 
such activations, since it identifies voxels active in both the AS and PA conditions, relative to 
the PS and AA conditions.  Because our a priori hypothesis was that activations related to the 
sense of agency should be specific to the AS condition, and absent from the PA condition, we 
instead used a more specific contrast based on, an exclusive masking procedure: [(AS-PS) at 
p<0.0005 masked exclusively by (AA-PA) at p<0.0005, and k>10].  This contrast identifies 
voxels selective for active movements with synchronous visual feedback that were not due to 
making active movements alone. 
Second, the additive model predicts that the ownership-related activations in the PS 
condition should also appear in the AS condition.  Thus, activations in the PS condition should 
be a subset of those in the AS condition and there should be no activations specific to PS.  The 
independence hypothesis, in contrast, predicts that agency-related activations in the AS 
condition and ownership-related activations in the PS conditions should differ qualitatively.  
Thus, the independence model predicts that there should be activations found uniquely in the PS 
condition, while the additive model predicts that there should not.  To identify any such 
activations, we used an exclusive masking procedure [(PS-AS) at p<0.0005 masked exclusively 
by (PA-AA) at p<0.0005, and k>10], to identify voxels that were selective for synchronous 
visual feedback following passive, but not active, movements. 
Third, the additive model predicts that ownership-related activations should be common to 
the PS and the AS conditions.  The independence model, in contrast, predicts that there should 
not be activations common to the PS and AS conditions, that are not also shared by the 
asynchronous conditions.  To identify such regions, we used an inclusive masking procedure 
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[(AS-AA) at p<0.0005 masked inclusively with (PS-PA) at p<0.0005, and k>10] to identify 
voxels that were commonly activated during synchronous video feedback, independent of 
movement type. 
The two models make one common prediction, that the AS condition should involve an 
activation unique to agency (see Table 1).  More importantly, the models also make two 
divergent predictions.  The independence model predicts some activation unique to the PS 
condition, whereas the additive model predicts no such activations.  Second, the additive model 
predicts activations common to the PS and AS conditions, while the independence model 
predicts no such activations.  The set of masked contrasts described above, therefore, allow the 
two models to be directly tested. 
Results 
Subjective Reports  
The mean ratings for the body-ownership questions per condition were submitted to a 
2x2 ANOVA with the two factors of movement (i.e. active vs passive movement) and feedback 
(i.e. synchronous vs asynchronous) (see Table 2). There were significant main effects of type of 
movement and feedback (F(1,18)=17.48, p<0.05) and F(1,18)=28.25, p<0.05, respectively). The 
interaction between the two factors, however, was not significant (F(1,18)=.1, p>0.05). 
Participants reported a stronger sense that the viewed image was their own hand for synchronous 
than for asynchronous views, in both passive and active conditions. The passive condition 
corresponds to a pure sense of body-ownership (i.e., that the viewed image is linked to one’s 
own body), uncontaminated by sense of agency. Active movement with synchronous feedback 
also elicited a significantly stronger sense of body-ownership than the equivalent passive 
movement condition (t(18)=4.4, p<0.05).  
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The mean ratings for the agency questions were analysed with a 2x2 ANOVA with the 
two factors of movement (i.e. active vs passive movement) and feedback (i.e. synchronous vs 
asynchronous). There were significant main effects of type of movement and feedback 
(F(1,18)=40.85, p<0.05) and F(1,18)=64.61, p<0.05, respectively). The interaction between the 
two factors was also significant (F(1,18)=4.35, p =.05). This interaction shows that the feeling 
that one can voluntarily control the body at will is selectively present in the AS condition.  As 
predicted, active movement with synchronous feedback elicited a significantly stronger sense of 
agency than the equivalent passive movement condition (t(18)=7.1, p<0.0001).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 2AROUND HERE 
Number of Movements 
The total number of movements performed in each condition by each subject was 
counted after the experiment by observation of the recorded videos.  The mean number of 
movements performed in each condition was analysed using a 2x2 ANOVA with the two factors 
of movement (i.e. active vs passive movement) and feedback (i.e. synchronous vs 
asynchronous). The main effect of type of movement (i.e. active vs passive) was not significant 
(F(1,18)=2.62, p>0.05). Significantly more finger movements occurred in synchronous than 
asynchronous blocks (15.5 vs. 14.5) (F(1,18)=124.62, p<0.0001). This effect was modulated by 
movement type, (F(1,18)=11.34, p<0.05); the difference between synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions was larger for active (15.9 vs. 14.4) than for passive (15.1 vs. 14.5) 
movement blocks. To eliminate confounds associated with total amount of movement, the 
number finger movements in each block was included as a separate block-level regressor in 
analyses of fMRI data. 





First, we investigate the main effects of movement type and visual feedback. Table 3 
shows the local maxima of brain areas with increased neural activity assessed for the main 
effects of the experimental design.  
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
The main effect of active movement [(AA+AS)-(PA+PS)] was associated with bilateral 
activity in the cerebellum, primary motor cortex, the postcentral gyrus, and the inferior parietal 
lobule. The main effect of passive movement [(PA+PS) - (AA+AS)] was associated with 
bilateral activations in the postcentral gyrus, the medial frontal gyrus, the right precuneus, and 
the anterior cingulate.  
The main effect of synchronous visual feedback [(AS+PS)-(AA+PA)] elicited 
activations in the right (ipsilateral) postcentral gyrus, the left posterior insula, and the cerebellum 
bilaterally. The main effect of asynchronous delayed visual feedback [(AA+PA)-(AS+PS)] 
elicited activations in the right inferior parietal lobule, and more precisely in the supramarginal 
gyrus and the angular gyrus. As shown in Figure 3, the patterns of activations in the 
supramarginal (BA40) and the angular gyri (BA39) are different. Mean beta values calculated in 
the supramarginal gyrus show that activity in this cluster was mainly driven by the AA condition 
(Figure 3a), while the mean beta values in the angular gyrus show that activity in this area was 
elicited both in the AA and PA conditions (Figure 3b).  Therefore, the supramarginal gyrus may 
code for sensorimotor conflicts, while the angular gyrus may code for intersensory conflicts. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
Specific activations related to agency 
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As described above, both models predict activations related to the sense of agency to be 
observed specifically in the AS condition.  Thus, we performed an exclusive masking procedure 
[(AS-PS) at p<0.0005 masked exclusively by (AA-PA) at p<0.0005, and k>10] to determine 
activations that were unique to the difference between active and passive movements with 
synchronous visual feedback, but that cannot be accounted by a general confound of the 
presence of intentional movement. Table 4 shows the local maxima of brain areas that were 
active for this contrast, including the right superior parietal cortex, the pre-supplementary motor 
area (see Figure 4a), the dorsal premotor cortex (BA6) bilaterally, and the cerebellum bilaterally. 
A distributed neural network of sensorimotor brain areas in frontal and parietal areas was more 
active in the AS than the PS condition.  These differences cannot be explained simply by the 
presence of movement alone or by synchronous visual feedback alone. The observed pattern 
suggests that the sense of agency is underpinned by different brain areas from those related to 
the sense of body-ownership. Importantly no activations in the primary motor cortex were 
observed. 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
In addition to this core, several other areas are listed in table 4.  Not all of these are 
discussed here, because of the risk of overinterpretation.  However, some of these additional 
activations, such as the left inferior temporal gyrus, have previously been found in other studies 
of self-consciousness.  For example, Vogeley et al. (2004) found activation in this area for 
events viewed in first-person compared to third-person perspective.  Similarly, we found an 
agency-specific activation in the right Anterior Insula.  Activations in this area were found when 
participants judged visual feedback as congruent with their own action (Farrer & Frith, 2002).  
Interestingly, anterior insula activation is also associated with the marking of subjective time 
(for a review see Craig, 2009), distortions of which are an established feature of agency 
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(Haggard, Clark & Kalogers, 2002). The role of this area in self-consciousness is also confirmed 
by its activation for visual recognition of one’s own face (Devue et al., 2007), while lesion in the 
mid-posterior insula has been linked to anosognosia for hemiplegia (Karnath, Baier & Nagele, 
2005), and somatoparaphrenic delusions (Baier & Karnath, 2008; see also Tsakiris et al., 2007). 
Activations common to AS and PS conditions 
The additive model predicts that body-ownership is common to conditions with 
synchronous video feedback, regardless of whether active or passive movements are made.  We 
implemented an inclusive masking procedure [(AS-AA) at p<0.0005 masked inclusively with 
(PS-PA) at p<0.0005, and k>10] to determine voxels that were commonly activated in the two 
contrasts. No suprathreshold activations were observed.  This absence of activation is predicted 
by the independence model, but is inconsistent with the additive model. 
Activations specific to the PS condition 
INSIDE FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
To examine whether the sense of body-ownership in the absence of movement is 
underpinned by a distinct set of brain areas independent from those underlying the sense of 
agency we performed an additional analysis. We implemented an exclusive masking procedure 
[(PS-AS) at p<0.0005 masked exclusively by (PA-AA) at p<0.0005, and k>10] to determine 
activations that were unique to a purely sensory sense of body-ownership (PS), that cannot be 
accounted for by the experiences present in AS condition (see Table 4). Brain areas that were 
uniquely activated in the PS condition included medial anterior and posterior brain areas such as 
the superior medial gyrus (see Figure 4b), the precuneus, and the posterior cingulate gyrus.  In 
sharp contrast to the activations observed uniquely in the AS condition, the present contrast 
revealed activations in midline cortical structures. These activations suggest that the sense of 
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body-ownership generated during sensory stimulation is underpinned by a different neural 
network from the one engaged during active movement and experienced agency.  This finding 
provides direct support for the independence model, and is inconsistent with the additive model. 
Discussion 
We investigated the neural signatures of the sense of agency and sense of body-
ownership.  We manipulated whether finger movements were actively generated by participants 
or passively generated by an experimenter, while presenting either real-time or systematically 
delayed visual feedback.  Previous studies showed that temporal congruency between different 
sensory modalities can cause a sense of body-ownership in purely sensory situations such as the 
RHI (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005; Longo et al. 2008). Temporal 
congruency between sensory and motor signals can produce a sense of agency during voluntary 
movement (Tsakiris et al. 2006; Longo and Haggard 2009).  Analysis of subjective reports 
collected after the fMRI session supported this view. The main effect of feedback was 
significant suggesting that synchronous video feedback produced the feeling that participants 
were seeing their own body, while asynchronous video feedback did not.  In contrast, a sense of 
agency over the perceived hand appeared only following actively generated movements 
combined with synchronous video feedback. 
The fMRI data shows that the main effect of synchronous visual feedback resulted in 
activations in the ipsilateral (right) somatosensory cortex. The ipsilateral, rather than 
contralateral, location suggests that this activation did not primarily reflect afferent input. Other 
studies suggested a role for the right somatosensory cortex in the self-other distinction (Ruby 
and Decety 2001, 2003; Agnew and Wise 2008) and in body-awareness (Hari et al. 1998; 
Schwartz et al. 2005).  In contrast, the main effects of asynchronous visual feedback resulted in 
activations in the right angular and supramarginal gyri.  Interestingly, the profile of mean beta 
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values in these clusters was not homogeneous (see Figure 3).  Activation of the supramarginal 
gyrus was most prominent when active movements were presented in asynchronous display (i.e. 
AA condition), while the angular gyrus was activated when both active and passive movements 
were presented in asynchronous display (i.e. for both the AA and PA conditions). This pattern 
extends previous findings (Balslev et al. 2005; Farrer et al. 2008), suggesting that the angular 
gyrus codes for an intersensory conflict between vision and sensory information, that affects 
body-ownership and agency.  In contrast, the supramarginal gyrus may code for sensorimotor 
conflicts that are critical only for the sense of agency, because of the selective response of this 
area to discrepancy between active movement and visual feedback. It is unlikely that is 
activation was caused simply by a conflict between proprioceptive and visual signals as this was 
also present in the passive movement condition. A recent study (Farrer et al. 2008) showed a key 
role of the right angular gyrus in action awareness.  In our study, one cluster (centred at 52, -38, 
38) showed highest mean beta values for the AA condition, corresponding to the activation 
reported by Farrer et al. (2008), while another, more inferior, cluster (40, -58, 26) in the angular 
gyrus showed comparable activity for both the AA and PA conditions, suggesting that it reflects 
neural responses to intersensory conflict between proprioception and vision. Overall, these 
results suggest that the right supramarginal gyrus is activated during sensori-motor conflicts that 
may result in the experience of non-agency, while the angular gyrus is activated during 
intersensory conflicts that may result in a loss of body-ownership (see also Shimada et al, 2005. 
Timing information alone cannot distinguish the sense of body-ownership from the sense 
of agency, or identify the relation between them. According to the additive model, a similar 
sense of body-ownership would be present both for active and passive movement conditions 
with synchronous visual feedback, but the sense of agency would additionally be present 
following voluntary movements. Interestingly, the introspective evidence broadly supported the 
additive view: participants reported significantly more agreement with questionnaire items 
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reflecting agency in the AS condition compared to the other three conditions. In particular, 
body-ownership questions were also more highly rated in the AS condition as compared to the 
PS condition, suggesting that agency strengthens the experience of body-ownership. If the 
addition of agency to body-ownership enhances the same kind of experience, then we would 
expect to find at least some shared activations between agency and body-ownership.  Another 
hypothesis suggests that agency is not simply an addition to body-ownership, but a qualitatively 
different process.  This independence model would predict different patterns of brain activity in 
the two cases. To distinguish between these possibilities, we first used an inclusive masking 
analysis to look for brain areas that are commonly activated by agency (induced via active 
movement) and a sensory-driven body-ownership (induced via passive movement). This 
analysis revealed no suprathreshold activations common to the two conditions, inconsistent with 
the additive model.  A second analysis based on exclusive masking was used to evaluate the 
model of independence between agency and body-ownership. Both body-ownership and agency 
were associated with distinct and exclusive patterns of activation, providing direct evidence that 
their neural substrates differ. 
Thus, neuroimaging data supported an independence model, while questionnaire data 
supported an additive model. This somewhat surprising inconsistency may be explained in at 
least two distinct ways.  First, the questionnaire data may reflect a limitation of the folk 
psychological concepts used to describe our embodied experience during sensation and 
movement.  Folk psychology suggests that agency is a very strong cue for ownership, so that I 
experience ownership over more or less any events or object that I control. However, the 
experience of ownership of action during agency may represent a distinctive type of ownership 
that should not be necessarily conflated with ownership of sensations or body-parts.  For 
example, Marcel distinguished between attributing an action to one’s self, and attributing the 
intentional source of the action to one’s self.  Patients with anarchic hand have a clear sense that 
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their involuntary movements are their own, but they strongly deny intending them (Marcel, 
2003).  Since the patients often themselves report this dissociation as surprising, folk psychology 
may not adequately capture the difference between ownership of intentional action and 
ownership of bodily sensation. Second, the apparent dissociation between neural activity and 
introspective reports may suggest that there is not a one-to-one mapping between brain activity 
and conscious experience.  In our data, qualitatively similar subjective experiences of ownership 
appear to be generated by quite different brain processes in the PS and AS condition. In 
particular, our finding of activations present in the PS, but not the AS, condition, and vice versa, 
directly contradicts the additive model, in which activations related to body-ownership should be 
a subset of those related to agency.  Models involving a single neural correlate of each specific 
consciousness experience have been highly successful in the study of individual sensory 
percepts, particularly in vision (Haynes & Rees, 2006).  However, the aspects of self-
consciousness which we call sense of body-ownership and sense of agency are not unique 
elemental percepts or qualia in the same way.  Rather, they may be a cluster of subjective 
experiences, feelings and attitudes (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008).  Our data suggest 
identifying neural correlates of these kinds of experience may be more problematic than 
identifying neural correlates of single percepts. 
The specific brain areas associated with agency and with ownership shed further light on 
these two components of self-consciousness. The pre-SMA is strongly involved in the voluntary 
control of action (Goldberg 1985), and contributes to the experience of volition itself (Fried et 
al. 1991).  In our study, voluntary action was present in both the AS and AA conditions: these 
differed only in timing of visual feedback, and the resulting sense of agency.  However, the pre-
SMA activation was greater in the AS condition, where visual feedback confirms that the 
observed movement is temporally related to the voluntary motor command.  Our findings 
therefore suggest that the pre-SMA plays an important role not only in conscious intention (Lau 
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et al. 2004), but also in the sense of agency. The role of pre-SMA in the present experiment 
could either reflect an advance intention-based prediction of the sensory feedback of action, or a 
delayed postdictive attribution of sensory feedback to the self.  Our fMRI data lack the temporal 
resolution to decide between these two alternatives.  Interestingly, lesions to the supplementary 
motor area and/or the anterior corpus callosum may result in Anarchic Hand Syndrome 
(Goldberg, Mayer, and Toglia 1981; Della Sala, Marchetti, and Spinnler 1994).  Despite the 
autonomous behaviour of the affected hand, these patients retain a sense of body-ownership of 
the moving hand, but they report an inability to control it (see also Marcel 2003).  These results 
are consistent with our findings of a pre-SMA activation related specifically to agency.  
In relation to a purely sensory-driven body-ownership, we observed suprathreshold 
activations in a network of midline cortical structures including the precuneus, the superior 
frontal gyrus and the posterior cingulate. These midline cortical activations recall recent 
suggestions of a dedicated self-referential processing network (Northoff and Bermpohl 2004). 
Meta-analyses of imaging studies revealed activations in medial regions of the brain during 
processing of self-related stimuli (Wicker et al. 2003; Northoff et al. 2006). In particular, ventral 
and posterior cortical midline structures seem to underpin distinct self-related processes, with 
more anterior structures related to the processing of extero- and interoceptive stimuli for their 
relation to the self (Northoff and Bermpohl 2004), and the more posterior areas with higher-
order self-representations such as self-identity and perspective taking (Vogeley et al. 2001).  
These midline activations are also similar to regions of the so-called ‘default mode network’, 
activated in the absence of any goal-directed task (Raichle et al. 2001). Intriguingly, several 
lines of evidence suggest that this default network is involved in self-referential processes 
(Gusnard et al. 2001; Schneider et al. 2008).  Northoff and Bermpohl (2004) ask ‘is there a 
‘psychological baseline’?’ corresponding to this apparent physiological baseline. We suggest 
that the feeling of ownership over one’s body, ‘the feeling of the same old body always there’ in 
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James’ (1890) terms, comprises an important (and perhaps dominant) part of this psychological 
baseline.  Importantly, this baseline for the bodily self appears to have a neural basis quite 
distinct from that for volition. 
To conclude, the present experiment contrasted two alternative models of the relation 
between body-ownership and agency. While the analysis of the introspective reports lends 
support to the additive model, the analysis of the fMRI data show support for the independence 
model. Activity in premotor areas (pre-SMA and BA6) was associated with the sense of agency, 
while activity in midline cortical structures was associated with a purely sensory-driven sense of 
body-ownership. In addition, the analysis showed no shared activations between the two. This 
apparent dissociation between agency and body-ownership is further supported by the literature 
on the anarchic hand syndrome (Della Sala, Marchetti & Spinnler, 1994; Marcel 2003). Such 
patients report a lack of sense of agency over the anarchic hand, while they do retain a sense of 
body-ownership. Interestingly, the reverse dissociation, whereby people would experience 
agency, but not body-ownership, is harder to envisage. However, cases of patients with 
anosognosia with hemiplegia who also display somatoparaphrenic delusions may represent one 
such case. When the examiner asks the patient to look at her arm and report whose hand is this, 
the patient would say that this arm belongs to someone else (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009) However, 
if the patient is asked whether she can move her left arm, she would deny paralysis and report 
her ability to move voluntarily, displaying a non-veridical awareness of her agency (Fotopoulou 
et al., 2008). Note, however that anosognosia for hemiplegia can also dissociate from 
somatoparaphrenia (Cutting, 1978). Interestingly, recent lesion mapping studies show that the 
critical lesion site for anosognosia for hemiplegia is the right premotor cortex (BA6 and BA44, 
see Berti et al. 2005), while the critical lesion sites for somatoparaphrenia symptoms may 
involve the temporoparietal cortex and the posterior insula (Baier & Karnath, 2008; Vallar & 
Ronchi, 2009).  Studies of deafferentation also support the dissociation between agency and 
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body-ownership. IW’s performance in agency tasks (Haggard & Cole, 2007) suggests that his 
sense of agency is normal, while his sense of his own body is clearly dramatically affected, as 
illustrated both by his subjective reports (Cole, 1995) and by his difficulty in using his own 
somatosensory experiences as a reference to understand others (Bosbach , Cole , Prinz & 
Knoblich, 2005). Taken together, the results of the present study suggest a qualitative distinction 
between the brain bases of sense of agency and sense of body ownership, consistent with the 
neuropsychological literature. Different neural networks appear to underlie our experience of 
embodiment in sensation and in action, even though the experiences themselves have common 
elements. There are many cases in psychology where quite different mechanisms can be enlisted 
for a common behavioural or perceptual goal: reading by words and reading by letters are the 
best known example.  Our findings suggest that the unified experience of one’s own body may 
similarly depend on two quite different neural mechanisms. How the various networks reported 
in the literature interact to produce the unity of bodily self-consciousness that characterises 
everyday life, and that appeared in our participants’ subjective reports, remains a key topic for 
future research. 
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Table 1: The respective predictions of the additive and independence models, along 















There should be an additional activation in agency, 









There should be no 
activation in the body-
ownership that is not 
also present in agency. 
 
There should be a specific 
activation in body-










There should be some 




There should be no 
common activations 





inclusively with (PS-PA) 
 
Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership 
  
31
Table 2. Mean responses (plus SD) to subjective report questionnaire. 
 
Questionnaire item: Synchronous Asynchronous 
 “During the block there were times when…” Active Passive Active Passive 
1) “…it felt like the hand I was looking at was my 
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Table 3. Transformed Z scores from an SPM{F} for the main effects. We show areas 
predicted that survive p < 0.05 small volume correction using a 10 mm sphere over 
coordinates from previous studies (x=44,y=-54,z=38, see Farrer et al., 2008),areas that 
were not predicted, but that survive correction for multiple comparisons across whole 
brain (FDR) at p < 0.05, areas for which no prediction was made, which are significant at 
p < 0.001 uncorrected for clusters of more than 10 voxels. L/R: left and right 
hemispheres. [† p<0.001 uncorrected, ‡ FDR, * SVC] 
Brain Regions MNI 
Coordinates 
Z-score KE  
 x y z    
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Table 4. Transformed Z scores from an SPM{F} for the planned comparisons for 
the independence models of agency and body-ownership. Each contrast and its mask 
were thresholded at p<0.0005 and k>10 voxels.L/R: left and right hemispheres. 
 
Additional activations for agency not present for body ownership  
(AS-PS) exclusively masked by (AA-PA) 
Brain Regions MNI Coordinates Z-score KE 
 x y z   
R Cerebellum (VI) 24 60 24 5.97 1972 
L Cerebellum (Crus 1) -34 -68 30 5.70 1016 
R Precentral Gyrus (BA6) 54 4 38 5.14 1072 
R Anterior Insula 40 10 -2 4.95 352 
R Precentral Gyrus (BA6) 38 -10 58 4.84 614 
R Superior Parietal Lobule (BA7) 32 -58 58 4.68  
L Postcentral Gyrus (BA3) -36 -26 54 4.76 337 
L Precentral Gyrus (BA6) -38 -14 54 4.75  
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus (BA19) 42 -82 0 4.69 263 
L SMA (BA6) -12 6 48 4.55 620 
R SMA (BA6) 6 10 48 4.46  
R SMA (BA6) 10 0 68 4.20  
R Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA45) 52 44 14 4.44 123 
L Superior Temporal Gyrus -48 0 -2 4.31 69 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA40) -36 -42 52 4.26 169 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus (BA19) -52 -78 6 3.70 56 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA44) -34 14 38 4.06 34 
R Superior  Frontal Gyrus (BA8) 42 26 46 3.95 18 
L precentral Gyrus (BA6) -28 -10 62 3.90 28 
L Thalamus  -22 -18 -4 3.87  
L Precentral Gyrus (BA6) -58 2 32 3.86 51 
L Cerebellum -16 -52 -50 3.74 14 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus  36 50 30 3.62 15 
 




Specific activations for body ownership not present for agency 
(PS-AS) exclusively masked by (PA-AA) 
Brain Regions MNI Coordinates Z-score KE 
 x y z   
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus (BA20) -58 -20 -34 4.69 138 
L Fusiform gyrus (BA20) -52 -12 -30 4.15  
L Fusiform gyrus (BA20) -64 -8 -28 3.74  
R Superior Medial Gyrus (BA9) 8 62 24 4.40 536 
L Superior Medial Gyrus (BA9) -8 66 16 4.40  
L Superior Medial Gyrus (BA9) -4 62 24 4.32  
L Posterior Cingulate (BA23) -2 -56 18 4.40 195 
L Precunues (BA19) -46 -68 48 4.05 12 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus  (BA41) 48 -38 0 3.96 11 
R Fusiform Gyrus (BA20) 56 -14 -30 3.90 22 
L Postcentral Gyrus (BA5) -28 -38 74 3.78 16 
L Cuneus (BA18) -2 -86 28 3.77 11 
L Precuneus (BA7) -4 -50 52 3.66 10 
L Cuneus (BA7) 2 -72 30 3.64 23 
 
 




Figure 1: The experimental set-up in the fMRI suite.  
Figure 2: Psychometric Data. Error bars indicate standard errors.  
Figure 3: Mean bold responses across conditions for the main effect of asynchronous 
visual feedback in the supramarginal (see 3a) and angular gyri (see 3b). Error bars indicate 
standard errors. 
Figure 4: Mean bold responses across conditions for the independence model of agency 
(see 4a) and body-ownership (see 4b). Error bars indicate standard errors. 
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